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A B S T R A C T
Cognitive oﬄoading refers to our reliance on the external environment in order to reduce cognitive demand. For
instance, people write notes on paper or smartphones in order not to forget shopping lists or upcoming ap-
pointments. A plausible hypothesis is that such oﬄoading relies on metamemory – our conﬁdence in our future
memory performance. However, this hypothesis has not been directly tested, and it remains unclear when and
how people use external sources to aid their encoding and retrieval of information. In four experiments, here we
asked participants to learn word pairs and decide whether to oﬄoad some of the pairs by “saving” them on a
computer. In the memory test, they had the opportunity to use this saved information on half of trials.
Participants adaptively saved the most diﬃcult items and used this oﬄoaded information to boost their memory
performance. Crucially, participants' conﬁdence judgments about their memory predicted their decisions to use
the saved information, indicating that cognitive oﬄoading is associated with metacognitive evaluation about
memory performance. These ﬁndings were accommodated by a Bayesian computational model in which beliefs
about the performance boost gained from using oﬄoaded information are negatively coupled to an evaluation of
memory ability. Together our ﬁndings highlight a close link between metamemory and cognitive oﬄoading.
1. Introduction
Learning often relies on external tools and resources. For example,
when we attend lectures in school, we write things down into a note-
book rather than relying on memory alone because we believe a written
record is more reliable. Following a rapid development in modern
technology, we now also save information into our smartphones or
computers to reduce memory load. However, we still lack an under-
standing of when and how people rely on external sources to facilitate
memory. In the current paper we pursue a hypothesis that use of ex-
ternal resources is intimately linked to metacognitive evaluations of
memory performance (Arango-Muñoz, 2013; Finley, Naaz, & Goh,
2018; Risko & Gilbert, 2016).
Human learners are able to self-regulate behavior to optimize
memory performance (for a review, see Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell,
2013). For instance, previous studies indicate that people tend to
restudy previously unrecalled rather than recalled items and spend
more time learning diﬃcult than easy items (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008;
Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005). These strategies can eﬃciently improve
memory (Bjork et al., 2013). However, fewer studies have investigated
a distinct, but potentially equally important type of self-regulation – our
reliance on external storage (Risko & Dunn, 2015). For example, we
might write down crucial information such as a phone number or type it
into a smartphone, and then later attempt to ﬁnd the relevant in-
formation (Risko & Dunn, 2015; Storm & Stone, 2015). This strategy is
known as “cognitive oﬄoading”, which refers to the use of physical
actions to alter the information processing requirements of a task (Risko
& Gilbert, 2016).
The aim of the present study is to shed light on when and how
people use external tools to aid their learning, by developing and em-
pirically validating a computational model that precisely characterizes
individuals’ use of oﬄoaded information. Compared with descriptive
theories, computational models are able to quantitatively characterise a
hypothesised cognitive process and provide insights that are otherwise
diﬃcult to obtain from traditional behavioural data analysis
(Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2011). In doing so we focus on the potential
link between metacognition and oﬄoading, as it is plausible that our
decisions of when to rely on outside assistance depend on metacognitive
appraisal of expected performance (Arango-Muñoz, 2013; Finley et al.,
2018; Risko & Gilbert, 2016).
Cognitive oﬄoading reduces cognitive demand on memory because
it reduces demands on internal storage. Rather than encoding
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individual items, people only need to remember the location of the
saved items (Risko & Gilbert, 2016; Wegner, 1987). Previous studies
have shown that allowing people to oﬄoad information can sig-
niﬁcantly improve performance on short-term and prospective memory
tasks (Gilbert, 2015a, 2015b; Risko & Dunn, 2015). However, it remains
unknown how people choose to oﬄoad cognitive demands during en-
coding and retrieval (Risko & Dunn, 2015). In the current study, we
asked participants to learn a series of word pairs and decide whether to
“save” the pairs to the computer. In a later memory test, on half of the
trials participants had the opportunity to use the oﬄoaded information,
whereas on the other half of trials it was unavailable. This design al-
lowed us to examine whether cognitive oﬄoading improves long-term
memory performance and, critically, establish how participants choose
to use oﬄoaded information during study and test.
According to a metacognitive model, whether people choose to
oﬄoad to-be-remembered items depends on metacognitive evaluation
(Dunn & Risko, 2016; Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Drawing on metacogni-
tive beliefs and experiences about internal and external memory sto-
rage, people choose the option that they believe will lead to higher
memory performance. The metacognitive model suggests that whether
people choose to oﬄoad to-be-remembered information should depend
on memory load. Higher memory load results in greater perceived
diﬃculty of remembering, leading participants to opt for external sto-
rage to reduce internal demands. Consistent with this hypothesis, Risko
and Dunn (2015) found that in a short-term memory task, as the
number of to-be-remembered items increased, the likelihood of oﬀ-
loading behavior increased. Similarly, Gilbert (2015a) found that in a
prospective memory task, when participants had to keep in mind spe-
ciﬁc task requirements for three items compared to one item, they
tended to set more frequent external reminders. Besides the number of
items, the decision to oﬄoad may also be related to item diﬃculty:
people should oﬄoad individual items more frequently when they are
more diﬃcult to remember (Schönpﬂug, 1986). In the present study, we
manipulated item diﬃculty to examine this inﬂuence on oﬄoading
behavior.
After deciding to oﬄoad information to the environment, people
must then decide whether to access the oﬄoaded information. In the
current study we also sought to model the factors that inﬂuenced these
decisions. One possibility is that people decide to rely on oﬄoaded
information when they believe that they cannot retrieve the items by
themselves, or when they have low conﬁdence about retrieving parti-
cular items. Previous studies on help-seeking behaviour reveal that
humans and animals tend to seek help from external sources when their
conﬁdence on a task is low, and rely more on their own abilities when
their conﬁdence is high (Desender, Boldt, & Yeung, 2018; Goupil,
Romand-Monnier, & Kouider, 2016; Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007).
Thus, similar to the oﬄoading decisions made during encoding, whe-
ther people decide to use oﬄoaded information should also depend on
metacognitive evaluation of self-performance. In addition, when people
decide whether to rely on oﬄoaded information, they should evaluate
not only their memory for individual items, but also the extent to which
they believe oﬄoaded information will improve memory performance.
In the current study, we examined the determinants of participants’
decisions to use oﬄoaded information and (in Experiments 2 and 3)
how such decisions related to their metacognitive evaluation (con-
ﬁdence) about how much oﬄoaded items would boost their perfor-
mance. We sought to accommodate these ﬁndings within a novel
probabilistic computational model that precisely characterizes how
people decide to use oﬄoaded information during memory retrieval.
To anticipate our results, across four experiments, we show that
allowing participants to use oﬄoaded information signiﬁcantly en-
hanced their memory performance. The diﬃculty of individual items
aﬀected participants’ decisions to use oﬄoading strategies at both en-
coding and retrieval. Our computational model indicated that partici-
pants’ beliefs about the boost in performance they would gain from
oﬄoaded information was negatively correlated with evaluations of
their memory ability, which in turn guided their decisions to use oﬀ-
loaded information during retrieval. Our ﬁndings support a close link
between cognitive oﬄoading and metacognition about memory per-
formance.
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
Twenty-seven participants (8 men; age: M=24.85 years,
SD=9.19) took part in the experiment at the Wellcome Centre for
Human Neuroimaging, University College London for monetary com-
pensation (£6 plus up to £2 bonus, dependent on performance in the
memory test). Participants were tested individually, and all provided
written informed consent. All participants spoke English as a ﬁrst lan-
guage and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All proce-
dures were approved by the local ethics committee.
2.1.2. Materials
The study materials consisted of 120 cue-target English word pairs.
All of the words were 4–8 letters in length and from the MRC
Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981). Of these word pairs, half
were easy pairs in which cue and target words were strongly related,
and half were diﬃcult pairs in which cue and target words were un-
related. The easy and diﬃcult pairs signiﬁcantly diﬀered in the forward
associative strength from cue to target words, which represents the
proportion of participants in the original norming study who ﬁrst re-
sponded with the target word when free associating to the cue word
(Kiss, Armstrong, Milroy, & Piper, 1973). The forward associative
strength was signiﬁcantly higher for easy pairs (M=0.43, SD=0.13)
than for diﬃcult pairs (0 for all of the diﬃcult pairs) according to the
Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus (Kiss et al., 1973). The number of
letters, number of syllables, word frequency and ratings of familiarity,
concreteness and imagability for cue and target words did not diﬀer
between easy and diﬃcult pairs, all ts < 1, all ps > 0.3. All of the
word pairs were randomly divided into three lists, and each list con-
tained 20 easy and 20 diﬃcult pairs. Another 12 word pairs (6 easy and
6 diﬃcult pairs) were used in the practice block. Please see Table S1 in
the Supplemental Information for the word pairs used in the current
study.
2.1.3. Procedure
Stimulus presentation and data acquisition were controlled by
Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997) running in MATLAB (http://www.
mathworks.com). The experiment contained three blocks. In each
block, participants learned a list of 40 word pairs and then took a
memory test for that list. The order of the lists was randomised across
participants. Before the experiment, participants read the instructions
and completed a practice block in which they were familiarized with
the full experimental procedure with 12 example word pairs. The
procedure of the learning phase is shown in Fig. 1A. During the learning
phase of each block, participants were required to study 40 word pairs
(20 easy and 20 diﬃcult pairs) sequentially. The word pairs were
presented in a pseudo random order in which no more than three word
pairs of the same diﬃculty were presented consecutively. In each trial,
a ﬁxation cross was ﬁrst presented for 500ms, and then a word pair was
presented in the center of the computer screen for 3 s. Immediately
following the presentation of each word pair, participants were asked to
decide whether to save this pair into the computer by pressing the 1 or
2 key. Before the experiment, participants were informed that they
could use the saved pairs to help them recall the words in the memory
test. In each block, they could save at most half of the list (i.e., 20 pairs)
into the computer. When they decided whether to save each pair, they
could see how many pairs had been presented and how many had been
saved so far. If participants had saved half of the list before the end of
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the list, then they could not save the remaining pairs in the list and
could only press the space bar to continue after the presentation of the
word pair. In data analysis, we removed trials in which participants
could not save the word pair (around 1% of the trials).
Participants took a memory test immediately after they ﬁnished
learning each list. There were two types of memory test: a forced-recall
test and a free-choice test. For each participant, the saved and unsaved
trials during learning were randomly assigned to the two test conditions
so that participants took the forced-recall test for half of the saved and
unsaved trials, and the free-choice test for the other half. The trials in
the two test conditions were randomly intermixed in the test phase with
the constraint that no more than three trials of the same type of test
were presented consecutively.
The procedure of the forced-recall and free-choice test is shown in
Fig. 1B and 1C. In the forced-recall test. a ﬁxation was ﬁrst presented
for 500ms, and then the cue word of a pair was presented on the screen.
Participants were instructed to use the keyboard to type the target word
and then press the Enter key to submit their answer. There was no time
limit for the recall test. After participants submitted the answer, feed-
back was presented for 1.5 s, showing the correctness of the answer and
the points that were won or lost. For each trial, participants gained 20
points if their answer was correct, or lost 20 points if the answer was
incorrect. In the memory test, a bar showing the total points earned was
always presented on the screen. The points were converted into a
monetary bonus awarded after the experiment.
In the free-choice test, the cue word of each pair was presented after
ﬁxation, and participants were asked to decide whether to recall the
target word by themselves or obtain a hint generated from the saved
pairs (“ask for help” trials). If they chose to answer by themselves, they
were prompted to type the target word and feedback showed the cor-
rectness of their answer and the points won or lost. A choice to ask for
help from the computer led to an immediate loss of 3 points, which was
shown on the screen for 800ms. If the word pair had been saved during
learning, the ﬁrst two letters of the target word were presented on the
Fig. 1. Experimental procedure for the task in Experiment 1. (A) Learning phase. (B) Forced-recall test. (C) Free-choice test.
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screen as a hint, and participants only needed to type the remaining
letters of the target word. However, if the pair had not been saved,
participants were prompted to type the whole target word without a
hint. Participants lost 3 points for the choice to ask for help regardless
of whether the word pair had been saved. This loss of 3 points was
introduced to dissuade them from asking for help on every trial, in-
centivising asking for help only when the beneﬁt of doing so (in terms
of improving memory performance) outweighed this cost. After parti-
cipants submitted their answers, feedback was presented showing the
correctness of their answer and points earned. Participants were shown
the total points they earned at the end of the experiment. In addition,
both before and after the experiment, they were shown how these
points were converted into a monetary bonus (see Table S2 in the
Supplemental Information).
2.1.4. Design
Experiment 1 used a within-participant design. In the learning
phase, the dependent variable was the proportion of saved word pairs
during learning, and the independent variable was item diﬃculty (easy
vs. diﬃcult). In the test phase, there were two dependent variables:
recall performance and the proportion of trials in which participants
asked for help in the free-choice test. For this ask-for-help proportion,
the independent variables were item diﬃculty and whether the word
pair was saved during learning (saved vs. unsaved). For recall perfor-
mance, the independent variables were item diﬃculty, saved/unsaved
pair and test type (forced-recall vs. free-choice). Participants could rely
only on their memory to recall the target words in the forced-recall test,
while in the free-choice test they could decide whether to use the oﬀ-
loaded information from the computer. We compared recall perfor-
mance in the forced-recall and free-choice tests to examine whether
allowing participants to use oﬄoaded information would signiﬁcantly
improve their memory.
2.1.5. Data analysis
The data from three blocks were collapsed in the analysis. We used
t-tests to analyse the eﬀect of item diﬃculty on the decisions to save the
word pairs during learning. To analyse the eﬀects of item diﬃculty,
whether the word pair was saved and test type (forced-recall/free-
choice) on the decisions to ask for help and recall performance in the
memory test, we built linear mixed eﬀect models in SPSS 22 to ac-
commodate missing data in some conditions for some participants. For
example, some participants did not save any easy word pair during
learning. Traditional repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
uses listwise exclusion, and none of the data from a participant can be
used if data from one condition is missing. In contrast, linear mixed
eﬀect models can handle missing data and incorporate all of the ex-
isting data into the model (Krueger & Tian, 2004). We added all main
eﬀects and interactions in the model as ﬁxed eﬀects. In addition, fol-
lowing Singmann and Kellen (2017), we added a random intercept for
participant and random slopes for all main eﬀects and interactions
except for the random slope for the highest-order interaction which is
perfectly confounded with the residual error term and is non-identiﬁ-
able. We speciﬁed “variance components” as the covariance structure to
prevent correlations among random eﬀects which otherwise led to
convergence problems. The F and p values for ﬁxed eﬀects are reported.
The partial eta squared (ηp2) is also reported as the eﬀect size for main
eﬀects and interactions (Richardson, 2011; Tippey & Longnecker,
2016).
2.1.6. Computational modeling
We developed a hierarchical Bayesian model to explain how parti-
cipants decided to ask for help from the computer in the free-choice
test. We assumed that before deciding whether to ask for help, parti-
cipants ﬁrst monitor their memory strength for the target word in the
current trial, and estimate the probability of recalling the target word,
Prec. For simplicity, we assume that the subjective recall probability is
the same as the objective recall probability, i.e. participants have good
metacognitive sensitivity at retrieval (Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). Prec
ranges between 0 and 1 and is distributed as a beta distribution:
P Beta a b~ ( , )rec rec rec
in which arec and brec are the two parameters of the beta distribution for
each participant. We re-parameterise the Prec distribution as follows:
=a U Vrec rec rec
= −b U V(1 )rec rec rec
in which Urec is the mean and Vrec is approximately equivalent to the
precision of the beta distribution. We speciﬁed Urec as the recall per-
formance (the proportion of recalled trials) in the forced-recall test for
each participant, which represents the overall memory strength without
the help of any hint.
We assume that participants decide whether to ask for help from the
computer based on the relative costs and beneﬁts of doing so. The ex-
pected values of recalling the target with and without a hint are:
= − −E without hint P P( ) ·20 (1 )·20rec rec
= + − − − −E with hint P P P P( ) ( )·20 (1 )·20 3rec hint s rec hint s_ _
Phint_s denotes participants’ subjective belief about how much the hint
will help them improve their performance in the memory test. The
diﬀerence between the two expected values is:
− = −E with hint E without hint P( ) ( ) ·40 3hint s_
This equation tells us that participants should choose to ask for help
when the expected value of using the hint is higher than that for recall
without hint, that is, when Phint_s > 0.075. We use a Bernoulli dis-
tribution to link participants’ choice data (1 when they choose to ask for
help and 0 when they choose to answer by themselves) and model
prediction for each trial in the free-choice test:
⎧
⎨⎩
>
<Choice ~
Bernoulli if P
Bernoulli if P
(0.999) 0.075
(0.001) 0.075
hint s
hint s
_
_
We set the parameters in the Bernoulli distribution as 0.999 or
0.001 instead of 1 or 0 to avoid error in Bayesian sampling.
There are several possible relationships between participants’ eva-
luation of their memory strength and their belief about how much hints
can boost their performance. First, participants may believe that the
boost from a hint is independent of their own memory ability.
Alternatively, they may believe that the hint can help them more when
the recall probability is higher. A third possibility is that they believe
the hint is more useful when it is more diﬃcult to recall by themselves.
Starting from these assumptions, we compared three diﬀerent families
of models of how Phint_s varies with memory strength. The Constant
model assumes that Phint_s is unrelated to Prec (a constant, β0), while the
Positive-slope and Negative-slope models incorporate a linear re-
lationship between Phint_s and Prec:
= +P β β P·hint s rec_ 0 1
The Positive-slope model assumes that β1 is positive (such that hints
are believed to provide more beneﬁt when memory strength is higher),
while the Negative-slope model assumes that β1 is negative (such that
hints are believed to provide more beneﬁt when memory strength is
lower). In addition, both models assume that Phint_s falls within the 0–1
range because the hint should not negatively aﬀect memory perfor-
mance, and the improvement of memory performance given by the hint
should not exceed the maximum recall probability of 1. Thus, in both
models, Phint_s is 1 when β0+ β1 · Prec > 1, and 0 when β0+ β1 ·
Prec < 0.
During model development, we realized that we could not estimate
both β0 and β1 in the Positive-slope and Negative-slope models. Both
models assume that participants ask for help when β0+ β1 ·
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Prec > 0.075, which is equal to Prec > (0.075− β0)/β1 in the Positive-
slope model and Prec < (0.075− β0)/β1 in the Negative-slope model.
In other words, changes in β0 can be mimicked by changes in β1. We
therefore deﬁned a new parameter C:
= −C β
β
0.075 0
1
C can be interpreted as a criterion on Prec: in the Positive-slope model,
participants choose to ask for help when Prec is higher than the cri-
terion, while in the Negative-slope model, participants ask for help
when Prec is lower than the criterion.
Whether participants receive a hint for a trial in the free-choice test
depends both on their choice and whether this trial has been saved. The
probability of recalling the target word with the help of hint is:
= ⎧⎨⎩
+ + <
+ ≥P
P P if P P
if P P
1
0.999 1rec with hint
rec hint o rec hint o
rec hint o
_ _
_ _
_
Here, Phint_o is the objective boost in recall success given the hint (which
is potentially diﬀerent from the subjective belief in the boost in success,
Phint_s). We again added a constraint in the models such that Prec_with_hint
could not exceed the maximum recall probability of 1 (if Prec+ Phint_o
was equal to or higher than 1, Prec_with_hint was set to 0.999 to avoid error
in Bayesian sampling). When the hint is not available, the recall
probability for the target word is simply Prec. We used a Bernoulli dis-
tribution to link participants’ recall data (1 for successful recall and 0
for unsuccessful recall) and model prediction for each trial in the free-
choice test:
⎧
⎨⎩
Recall ~
Bernoulli P if hint is avaliable
Bernoulli P if hint is unavaliable
( )
( )
rec with hint
rec
_ _
We ﬁtted the three models (the Constant model, Positive-slope
model and Negative-slope model) to participants’ decisions about
whether to ask for help and their memory performance in each trial of
the free-choice test. We used Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods implemented in JAGS (using the MATLAB interface matjags)
to sample from posterior distributions of parameters (Plummer, 2003).
The parameters in the models are β0 (in the Constant model) or C (in the
Positive-slope and Negative-slope model), Vrec and Phint_o (see the Sup-
plemental Information for the prior distribution of the parameters). We
separately estimated parameters for each condition of our 2 (easy vs.
diﬃcult)× 2 (saved vs. unsaved) design at both the participant- and
group-level. To further examine the relationship between the subjective
belief and objective eﬀect of the hints on memory performance in dif-
ferent experimental conditions, we also ﬁtted diﬀerent models in which
we forced β0 (or C) or Phint_o to be the same across diﬀerent conditions
for each participant and then compared the ﬁt of each model. This
factorial model comparison resulted in four hypothetical relationships
between β0 (or C) across diﬀerent conditions: (1) easy= diﬃcult,
saved=unsaved; (2) easy≠ diﬃcult, saved=unsaved; (3)
easy=diﬃcult, saved≠ unsaved; (4) easy≠ diﬃcult, saved≠ un-
saved. There were two diﬀerent relationships between Phint_o in diﬀerent
conditions: (1) easy=diﬃcult, (2) easy≠ diﬃcult, because partici-
pants can only receive a hint when the word pair was saved. Thus, we
ﬁtted 3×4×2=24 models in total.
We ﬁtted each model with 4 chains and each chain contained
100,000 samples. We discarded 50,000 samples per chain for burn-in,
resulting in 200,000 stored samples in total. Gelman and Rubin’s po-
tential scale reduction factor R̂ was calculated for all parameters in each
model (Gelman & Rubin, 1992). For 21 of the 24 models, R̂ values
were<1.1 for all parameters, indicating good convergence. Models
with R̂ > 1.1 were excluded from further analysis. We compared the
Deviance Information Criteria (DIC) of the converged models
(Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & Van Der Linde, 2002), and results from
the model with the lowest DIC are reported. We compared the predic-
tion of the winning model for participants’ decision and memory per-
formance in the free-choice test to the empirical data (a posterior pre-
dictive check). We also investigated the diﬀerence in the parameters of
the winning model between diﬀerent experimental conditions by
comparing the posterior distribution of the parameters at the group
Fig. 2. Ask-for-help behaviour and memory performance in the memory test of Experiment 1. (A) Proportion of ask-for-help trials in the free-choice test was aﬀected
by both item diﬃculty and whether the pair was saved. (B) Memory performance was signiﬁcantly higher in the free-choice than forced-recall test for saved pairs but
not for unsaved pairs. (C) Memory performance in the free-choice test was signiﬁcantly higher for saved (vs. unsaved) pairs only when participants asked for help.
The red points represent posterior predictives from the best-ﬁtting computational model. Error bars represent standard errors. (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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level.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Predictors of oﬄoading during learning
The proportion of saved word pairs during learning was sig-
niﬁcantly higher for diﬃcult (M=0.75, SD=0.18) compared to easy
pairs (M=0.15, SD=0.19), t (26)= 9.17, p < .001, d=1.76,
showing that participants’ decisions to oﬄoad were appropriately
sensitive to item diﬃculty.
2.2.2. Predictors of asking for help at test
We used a linear mixed eﬀects model (see Methods) to evaluate
predictors of asking for help during the test phase (see Fig. 2A). Parti-
cipants asked for help more frequently for diﬃcult pairs than for easy
pairs, F (1, 24.87)= 53.18, p < .001, ηp2=0.68, and the proportion of
ask-for-help trials was also higher when the word pair was saved during
learning, F (1, 51.35)= 16.55, p < .001, ηp2=0.24, demonstrating
adaptive use of oﬄoaded information. The interaction between these
predictors was not signiﬁcant, F (1, 51.35)= 1.66, p= .203,
ηp
2=0.03.
2.2.3. Impact of oﬄoading on recall performance
We next used a linear mixed eﬀects model to evaluate predictors of
recall performance (see Fig. 2B). Overall, participants recalled more
easy pairs than diﬃcult pairs, F (1, 25.83)= 53.26, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.67, as expected. We also found a signiﬁcant interaction between
test type and whether word pairs were saved during learning, F (1,
42.35)= 10.88, p= .002, ηp2=0.20. Speciﬁcally, recall performance
was signiﬁcantly higher on free-choice compared to forced-recall trials
for the saved pairs, F (1, 27.08)= 13.34, p= .001, ηp2=0.33, but not
for the unsaved pairs, F (1, 26)= 1.20, p= .283, ηp2=0.04, indicating
that using oﬄoaded information signiﬁcantly beneﬁted recall perfor-
mance in the free-choice test. In addition, participants recalled more
unsaved than saved pairs in the forced-recall test, F (1, 25.04)= 7.82,
p= .010, ηp2=0.24, suggesting that memory strength was overall
greater for unsaved than saved pairs. This diﬀerence was not signiﬁcant
in the free-choice test, F (1, 23.21)= 0.09, p= .773, ηp2 < 0.01. To-
gether this pattern of results suggests that using oﬄoaded information,
when available, improves performance by compensating for pre-ex-
isting diﬀerences in memory strength between items.
We also evaluated predictors of memory performance on free-choice
trials as a function of whether subjects chose to ask for help (see
Fig. 2C). Recall performance was signiﬁcantly higher when participants
chose to answer by themselves than to ask for help, F (1,
26.57)= 81.96, p < .001, ηp2=0.76, indicating that they asked for
help when their own memory strength was weak. There was also a
signiﬁcant interaction between the eﬀect of asking for help and whether
the word pair was initially saved, F (1, 35.73)= 17.16, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.32. While memory performance did not diﬀer for saved and
unsaved word pairs when participants chose to answer by themselves, F
(1, 26.86) < 0.01, p= .927, ηp2 < 0.01, they recalled more saved
pairs when they asked for help, F (1, 22.95)= 18.24, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.44, suggesting a selective beneﬁt of using oﬄoaded information
at test. Taken together, our results indicate that participants adaptively
chose to use hints to boost their performance in the free-choice test.
2.2.4. Computational modeling
We ﬁtted three sets of models (the Constant model, Positive-slope
model and Negative-slope model; see Methods) to both recall perfor-
mance and participants’ choices about whether to ask for help in the
free-choice test. All models assume that participants’ decisions to ask
for help are based on beliefs about the eﬀects of hints on recall per-
formance. However, the three sets of models diﬀer in their assumptions
about how these beliefs relate to metacognitive evaluations of memory
performance. The DIC (a measure of model ﬁt, where lower= better)
for the converged models is shown in Fig. 3A. The winning model with
the lowest DIC featured a negative correlation between beliefs about
how much hints will help at test and evaluations of memory strength. In
other words, when I am conﬁdent in being able to answer the question,
I think a hint will be of little beneﬁt, whereas when I am less conﬁdent I
begin to recognize the value of a hint. Notably the family of Negative-
slope models ﬁtted better than a corresponding family of Constant-slope
models, in which the beneﬁt of a hint is unrelated to memory
Fig. 3. The DIC scores of alternative models (lower is better) of the data from: (A) recall performance and decisions to ask for help in Experiment 1; (B) recall
performance and decisions to ask for help in Experiment 2a; (C) conﬁdence ratings in Experiment 2a.
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evaluation.
The winning model was able to capture both participants’ oﬄoading
behaviour and recall performance (Fig. 2). We found that the criterion
for asking for help (C) was signiﬁcantly more liberal for easy than
diﬃcult trials, mean of the diﬀerence=0.186, 95% CI [0.070 0.295]
(see Table 1). We also investigated the diﬀerence in the objective eﬀect
of the hints on recall performance (Phint_o) between easy and diﬃcult
trials, ﬁnding that the hint boosted memory performance more in the
easy condition, mean of the diﬀerence= 0.487, 95% CI [0.189 0.766]
(see Table 1). These results suggest participants were not only more
willing to ask for help for easy than diﬃcult pairs, but that they also
accrue more performance beneﬁt from the hint when they do so.
2.3. Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 revealed that participants' decisions to
oﬄoad both during learning and at test were aﬀected by item diﬃculty,
suggesting that metacognitive evaluation of diﬃculty may be related to
the use of cognitive oﬄoading during encoding and retrieval. In addi-
tion, we found that hints signiﬁcantly improved recall performance
when participants asked for help in the free-choice test, suggesting that
use of oﬄoaded information eﬃciently enhanced test performance.
Our best-ﬁtting computational model indicated that participants'
beliefs about whether hints could improve their performance were
negatively related to evaluations of memory strength (as inferred from
performance ﬂuctuations), such that asking for help was more frequent
when memory strength was weaker. Interestingly, the criterion for
asking for help was more liberal for easy than diﬃcult pairs. This result
suggests that participants were more willing to ask for help for easy
pairs when internal memory strength was matched, despite the actual
proportion of ask-for-help trials being higher for diﬃcult than easy
pairs because memory strength was on average weaker for diﬃcult
pairs. One explanation of this criterion diﬀerence is that additional
inﬂuences may lead participants to believe that hints will boost their
performance more for easy than diﬃcult pairs, even when memory
strength is matched. We could not directly investigate this hypothesis in
Experiment 1 because we did not have access to participants’ subjective
beliefs about the eﬀects of hints on memory performance.
The results from Experiment 1 suggest a close relationship between
metacognition and cognitive oﬄoading. In Experiment 2 we set out to
directly probe metacognitive evaluations of performance by asking for
conﬁdence ratings about the ability to recall the target words. In
diﬀerent trials, participants were asked to rate their conﬁdence before
the memory test about being able to recall with or without the help of a
hint (similar to a delayed judgment of learning (JOL) (Nelson & Narens,
1990; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011)). By comparing conﬁdence levels be-
tween these trial types we were able to directly assay beliefs about how
hints would boost performance, and quantify possible inﬂuences (such
as word pair diﬃculty) on such beliefs. We also extended our compu-
tational modeling framework to account for participants’ conﬁdence
ratings, providing a uniﬁed account of how metacognitive evaluations
of performance relate to changes in oﬄoading behaviour.
3. Experiments 2a and 2b
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Twenty-seven participants (9 men; age: M=24.26 years,
SD=9.68) took part in Experiment 2a at the Wellcome Centre for
Human Neuroimaging, University College London. Forty participants
(22 men; age: M=34.78 years, SD=12.47) were recruited online in
Experiment 2b via the Proliﬁc website (https://proliﬁc.ac/). The aim of
Experiment 2b was to replicate the results in Experiment 2a with an
online participant pool, which is more representative compared with
traditional lab-based research (Woods, Velasco, Levitan, Wan, &
Spence, 2015). Participants received monetary compensation for their
participation (£7.5 in Experiment 2a and £7 in Experiment 2b) and also
a bonus (up to £2, dependent on performance in the memory test).
Participants were tested individually, and all provided informed con-
sent. All participants spoke English as a ﬁrst language and reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All procedures were approved by
the local ethics committee.
3.1.2. Materials
The study materials were the same as those used in Experiment 1.
3.1.3. Procedure
Experiment 2a was programmed using Psychtoolbox running in
MATLAB and Experiment 2b was programmed using Gorilla (Anwyl-
Irvine, Massonnié, Flitton, Kirkham, & Evershed, 2018). The procedure
in Experiments 2a and 2b was similar to that in Experiment 1. The only
diﬀerence was that during the memory test, the cue word was presented
after the ﬁxation and participants were asked to give a conﬁdence
rating in being able to recall the word pair (see Fig. 4). All of the trials
in the memory test were randomly divided into conﬁdence-with-hint
and conﬁdence-without-hint condition. In the conﬁdence-with-hint
condition, the phrase “conﬁdence with hint” was presented on the
screen, and participants gave their conﬁdence about being able to recall
the target word with a hint. In the conﬁdence-without-hint condition,
the phrase “conﬁdence without hint” was presented and participants
gave their conﬁdence about being able to recall the target word without
help.
The two phrases were presented in diﬀerent colors to remind par-
ticipants of the two experimental conditions. For half of the participants
the “conﬁdence with hint” was presented in red while the “conﬁdence
without hint” was presented in green, and vice versa for the other half
of the participants. Participants indicated their conﬁdence on a sliding
scale. In Experiment 2a, arbitrary scale values of 1–6 were marked at
equal spacings. The initial cursor position on each trial was randomly
jittered around the midpoint of the scale (± 12% of scale length).
Participants used the left or right arrow key to move the cursor up or
down the scale. The ﬁnal cursor position was recorded as a continuous
variable on each trial (see Fig. 4). In Experiment 2b, a 0–100 scale was
used, and the numbers 0 and 100 were marked at the two ends of the
scale. Participants gave conﬁdence ratings by dragging a circle on the
slider with mouse. After giving the conﬁdence rating, participants took
the forced-recall or free-choice test in each trial as in Experiment 1.
Table 1
Parameter estimates from the winning models in Experiments 1–3.
Experiments
1 2a 2b 3
Model for recall and choices
C
Easy 0.611 (0.039) 0.649 (0.047) 0.695 (0.031) 0.620 (0.035)
Diﬃcult 0.425 (0.042) 0.415 (0.053) 0.521 (0.046) 0.620 (0.035)
Phint_o
Easy 0.649 (0.144) 0.224 (0.036) 0.631 (0.128) 0.501 (0.052)
Diﬃcult 0.162 (0.033) 0.224 (0.036) 0.291 (0.035) 0.195 (0.031)
Model for conﬁdence ratings
β0
Easy 0.291 (0.097) 0.243 (0.085) 0.221 (0.078)
Diﬃcult 0.291 (0.097) 0.243 (0.085) 0.277 (0.049)
β1
Easy −0.450 (0.384) −0.362 (0.380) −0.413 (0.423)
Diﬃcult −4.396 (18.402) −0.597 (0.629) −0.398 (0.378)
Note. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The parameters C, β0 and
β1 are constrained to be equal for saved and unsaved trials. The following
parameters are constrained to be equal for easy and diﬃcult trials in some of
the experiments: C (Experiment 3), Phint_o (Experiment 2a) and β0 (Experiments
2a and 2b).
X. Hu, et al. Cognition 193 (2019) 104012
7
3.1.4. Design
Experiments 2a and 2b used a within-participant design. For the
dependent variables that remained the same as in Experiment 1, in-
cluding the proportion of saved trials during learning, recall perfor-
mance and ask-for-help proportion in memory test, the experimental
design was the same as in Experiment 1. An additional dependent
variable in Experiments 2a and 2b was the conﬁdence rating in the free-
choice test, which was analysed as a function of item diﬃculty (easy vs.
diﬃcult), whether the word pair was saved during learning (saved vs.
unsaved), whether participants asked for help in the free-choice test
(ask-for-help vs. answer-by-themselves), and conﬁdence type (with-hint
vs. without-hint). We did not analyse the conﬁdence ratings in the
forced-recall test.
3.1.5. Data analysis
Data from three blocks were collapsed in the analysis. As in
Experiment 1, we used t-tests to analyse the eﬀect of item diﬃculty on
decisions to save the word pairs during learning and built linear mixed
eﬀect models to analyse the eﬀect of item diﬃculty, whether the word
pair was saved and test type (forced-recall/free-choice) on the decisions
to ask for help and recall performance in the memory test. Conﬁdence
ratings were converted into a percentage scale. We were unable to
conduct a full factorial 2 (easy vs. diﬃcult)× 2 (saved vs. unsaved)× 2
(ask-for-help vs. answer-by-themselves)× 2 (conﬁdence-with-hint vs.
conﬁdence-without-hint) analysis on conﬁdence ratings in the free-
choice test due to a high proportion of missing cells. Instead, we
combined saved and unsaved trials and built linear mixed eﬀect models
to analyse the eﬀects of item diﬃculty, answer/ask and conﬁdence
with/without hint on conﬁdence ratings. We also combined easy and
diﬃcult trials and analysed the eﬀects of saved/unsaved, answer/ask
and conﬁdence with/without hint on conﬁdence. In addition, to in-
vestigate individual diﬀerences in the decision to ask for help and its
relationship with conﬁdence rating and memory performance, we
analysed the correlation between participants’ overall proportion of
ask-for-help trials in the free-choice test, mean conﬁdence rating in the
free-choice test, and overall recall performance in the forced-recall test.
We also performed a mediation analysis using the PROCESS macro for
SPSS (Hayes, 2013) to examine the role of conﬁdence in mediating the
eﬀect of memory strength on decisions to ask for help.
3.1.6. Computational modeling
We ﬁrst ﬁtted the 24 models from Experiment 1 to participants’
choices and memory performance in the free-choice test. For 21 of the
24 models, the R̂ values were< 1.1 for all parameters, indicating good
convergence. The models with R̂ > 1.1 were excluded from analysis.
We then compared the DIC of the converged models. To foreshadow,
the winning model in both Experiments 2a and 2b belonged to the fa-
mily of Negative-slope models. For each participant, we then extracted
the posterior mean of the recall probability Prec for each trial and the
criterion parameter C for each experimental condition from the winning
model, and built a new model to explain participants’ conﬁdence rat-
ings in the free-choice test.
We assume that when participants estimate their conﬁdence in re-
calling a target word without a hint, their estimation is simply the Prec
for this word pair. In contrast, when they estimate their conﬁdence with
a hint, their estimation is the sum of Prec and their belief about how
much the hint could boost their performance for this pair (Phint_s).
According to the assumption of the Negative-slope model, the re-
lationship between Prec and Phint_s is:
= +P β β P·hint s rec_ 0 1
in which β1 is lower than 0, and:
= −C β
β
0.075 0
1
in which C is extracted from the winning model ﬁtted to participants’
choices and memory performance in the free-choice test. This re-
lationship places a constraint on β0: because β1 is lower than 0, and C is
a criterion on Prec about whether to ask for help and should be within
the 0–1 range, β0 should be higher than 0.075 to satisfy these con-
straints. Furthermore, β0 should also be lower than 1 because β0 is equal
to Phint_s when Prec is 0, and should fall within the 0–1 range.
After estimating an internal probability of recalling the target word
with or without a hint, participants then need to map this probability
onto the conﬁdence scale. We assume that this mapping may be biased
such that:
= +Predicted confidence without hint P bias( ) rec
= + +Predicted confidence with hint P P bias( ) rec hint s_
with the constraint that the predicted conﬁdence must be within the
0–1 range. Thus, the predicted conﬁdence is 1 when Prec+ bias > 1 or
Prec+ Phint_s+ bias > 1, and 0 when Prec+ bias < 0 or
Prec+ Phint_s+ bias < 0.
Finally, we assume that the empirical conﬁdence rating is drawn
from a normal distribution with a mean of the predicted conﬁdence and
a standard deviation of σconf, reﬂecting metacognitive noise in con-
ﬁdence reports (De Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan, 2013; Sanders,
Hangya, & Kepecs, 2016):
Fig. 4. Experimental procedure of the conﬁdence rating task in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2b, we used a 0–100 rating scale rather than the 1–6 scale.
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Confidence ~ Normal Predicted confidence σ( , )conf 2
For each experiment, we ﬁtted the model to participants’ conﬁdence
ratings with and without hint in the free-choice test. As in Experiment
1, we used Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods implemented
in JAGS to sample from posterior distributions of parameters (Plummer,
2003). The parameters in the model are β0, bias and σconf (See the
Supplemental Information for the prior distribution of the parameters).
We separately estimated β0 in 2 (easy vs. diﬃcult)× 2 (saved vs. un-
saved) conditions at both the participant- and group-level. In addition,
we examined the relationship between β0 in diﬀerent experimental
conditions. There were four diﬀerent relationships between β0 in dif-
ferent conditions for each participant: (1) easy=diﬃcult,
saved= unsaved; (2) easy≠ diﬃcult, saved=unsaved; (3)
easy=diﬃcult, saved≠ unsaved; (4) easy≠ diﬃcult, saved≠ un-
saved. Thus, we ﬁtted 4 models in total to the conﬁdence data. In each
experiment, we ﬁtted each model with 4 chains and each chain con-
tained 100,000 samples. We discarded 50,000 samples per chain for
burn-in, resulting in 200,000 stored samples in total. For all of the four
models in both experiments, the R̂ values were<1.1 for all parameters,
indicating good convergence. We report the results from the model with
the lowest DIC and compare predictions for participants’ conﬁdence
ratings to the empirical data. For each participant, we also calculated β1
in each condition from β0 and C, and compared β1 across diﬀerent
conditions using a Wilcoxon signed rank test (we used a non-parametric
test due to the presence of extreme values of β1).
3.2. Results
Figures of the results of Experiment 2b can be found in the
Supplemental Information.
3.2.1. Replication of patterns of oﬄoading behaviour and memory
performance
We ﬁrst asked whether the same patterns of oﬄoading behaviour
and memory performance in Experiment 1 were observed in
Experiments 2a and 2b. All key results were replicated: participants
saved more word pairs in the diﬃcult (Exp 2a: M=0.77, SD=0.16;
Exp 2b: M=0.71, SD=0.21) than easy (Exp 2a: M=0.12, SD=0.08;
Exp 2b: M=0.08, SD=0.13) condition, Exp 2a: t (26)= 18.71,
p < .001, d=3.60; Exp 2b: t (39)= 15.44, p < .001, d=2.44. Recall
performance for saved trials was signiﬁcantly higher in the free-choice
test than forced-recall test, Exp 2a: F (1, 44.10)= 12.34, p= .001,
ηp
2=0.22; Exp 2b: F (1, 54.76)= 13.46, p= .001, ηp2=0.20, and was
signiﬁcantly and selectively higher on saved (vs. unsaved) trials in the
free-choice test when people asked for help, Exp 2a: F (1,
23.47)= 8.72, p= .007, ηp2=0.27; Exp 2b: F (1, 54.49)= 8.27,
p= .006, ηp2=0.13. When participants answered by themselves, recall
performance in the free-choice test did not diﬀer between saved and
unsaved trials in Experiment 2a, F (1, 43.06)= 3.79, p= .058,
ηp
2=0.08, but was lower for saved trials in Experiment 2b, F (1,
70.61)= 4.86, p= .031, ηp2=0.06. Together, these results again re-
veal that hints signiﬁcantly improved memory performance for saved
trials when participants chose to ask for help. Finally, participants again
asked for help more frequently for diﬃcult pairs compared to easy
pairs, Exp 2a: F (1, 26.32)= 28.77, p < .001, ηp2=0.52; Exp 2b: F (1,
40.16)= 70.00, p < .001, ηp2=0.64, and for saved compared to un-
saved pairs, Exp 2a: F (1, 26.58)= 5.17, p= .031, ηp2=0.16; Exp 2b: F
(1, 76.52)= 30.54, p < .001, ηp2=0.29. In Experiment 2b there was
also an interaction suggesting that the diﬀerence in ask-for-help pro-
portion between saved and unsaved pairs was larger for diﬃcult (vs.
easy) trials, F (1, 76.52)= 5.64, p= .020, ηp2=0.07 (see Fig. 5 for
results of Experiment 2a and Fig. S1 for Experiment 2b).
3.2.2. Conﬁdence in recall performance
We next turned to the conﬁdence rating data in the free-choice test
(see Fig. 6A for results of Experiment 2a and Fig. S2A for Experiment
2b). Overall, participants’ conﬁdence was higher when they chose to
answer by themselves than ask for help, Exp 2a: F (1, 50.21)= 106.14,
p < .001, ηp2=0.68; Exp 2b: F (1, 64.40)= 196.38, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.75, suggesting that they only asked for help when their con-
ﬁdence about their memory was low. Their conﬁdence in being able to
provide the correct answer following a hint was also higher than
without a hint, Exp 2a: F (1, 46.32)= 25.60, p < .001, ηp2=0.36; Exp
2b: F (1, 44.31)= 27.64, p < .001, ηp2=0.38, conﬁrming that parti-
cipants believed hints would boost their performance. In addition,
participants’ conﬁdence was higher for easy than diﬃcult pairs, Exp 2a:
F (1, 28.81)= 11.24, p= .002, ηp2=0.28; Exp 2b: F (1,
80.70)= 46.00, p < .001, ηp2=0.36. More importantly, we obtained
a signiﬁcant interaction between the potential beneﬁt of hint and the
decision to ask for help, Exp 2a: F (1, 46.32)= 24.44, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.35; Exp 2b: F (1, 43.36)= 17.90, p < .001, ηp2=0.29. In
Experiment 2a there was also a three-way interaction between all these
factors, F (1, 42.42)= 10.72, p= .002, ηp2=0.20.
To unpack the drivers of these interaction eﬀects, we conducted
follow-up analyses on the conﬁdence ratings separated by whether
participants chose to answer by themselves or ask for help. Participants’
conﬁdence was signiﬁcantly modulated by item diﬃculty regardless of
their choice, Exp 2a: Fask (1, 21.08)= 4.32, p= .050, ηp2=0.17, Fanswer
(1, 26.04)= 9.48, p= .005, ηp2=0.27; Exp 2b: Fask (1,
61.96)= 11.33, p= .001, ηp2=0.15, Fanswer (1, 38.65)= 57.91,
p < .001, ηp2=0.60. For trials in which participants decided to ask for
help, their conﬁdence was also modulated by the potential beneﬁt of a
hint, Exp 2a: F (1, 23.07)= 23.58, p < .001, ηp2=0.51; Exp 2b: F (1,
38.95)= 21.36, p < .001, ηp2=0.35. In Experiment 2a, this eﬀect of
hints on conﬁdence was also stronger for easy compared to diﬃcult
trials, F (1, 17.58)= 8.57, p= .009, ηp2=0.33. These results suggest
that participants believed hints would signiﬁcantly enhance their
memory performance when they asked for help. In contrast, for trials in
which participants decided to answer by themselves, their conﬁdence
ratings were no longer aﬀected by the potential beneﬁt of a hint in
Experiment 2a, F (1, 26.23)= 0.03, p= .858, ηp2 < 0.01. In
Experiment 2b, while conﬁdence ratings were still modulated by the
potential beneﬁt of a hint when participants answered by themselves, F
(1, 39.29)= 4.20, p= .047, ηp2=0.10, this eﬀect was signiﬁcantly
smaller than that when they asked for help (as revealed by an inter-
action between ask/answer and conﬁdence with/without hint). Overall,
this pattern of ratings suggests that participants believed a hint would
not be as beneﬁcial on trials when they decided to answer by them-
selves.
We next asked whether the status of a word pair as saved or unsaved
aﬀected the conﬁdence rating given in the free-choice test (see Fig. 6B
for Experiment 2a and Fig. S2B for Experiment 2b). When participants
decided to answer by themselves, conﬁdence was signiﬁcantly higher
when the pair was unsaved compared to when it was saved, Exp 2a: F
(1, 26.00)= 8.05, p= .009, ηp2=0.24; Exp 2b: F (1, 38.09)= 29.78,
p < .001, ηp2=0.44. In contrast, for trials in which participants asked
for help, conﬁdence was not modulated by whether the pair was saved,
Exp 2a: F (1, 19.57)= 1.37, p= .256, ηp2=0.07; Exp 2b: F (1,
69.67)= 1.62, p= .207, ηp2=0.02.
Taken together, these results are consistent with a negative corre-
lation between participants’ evaluations of memory strength and their
beliefs about how much a hint will boost performance: conﬁdence was
signiﬁcantly lower when they chose to ask for help, and when they
decided to answer by themselves they believed hints would provide less
additional beneﬁt.
3.2.3. Computational modeling
We ﬁrst ﬁtted our three candidate sets of models (the Constant
model, Positive-slope model and Negative-slope model) to participants’
recall performance and choices about whether to ask for help. The DIC
scores of the converged models are shown in Fig. 3B for Experiment 2a
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and Fig. S3A for Experiment 2b. Replicating Experiment 1, the winning
model in both Experiments 2a and 2b with the lowest DIC was drawn
from the family of Negative-slope models, and the model ﬁtted well to
participants’ choice and recall performance (see Fig. 5 and Fig. S1)1.
Finally, similar to Experiment 1, the criterion parameter C was sig-
niﬁcantly more liberal for easy than diﬃcult trials, Exp 2a: mean of the
diﬀerence=0.234, 95% CI [0.090 0.367]; Exp 2b: mean of the dif-
ference=0.174, 95% CI [0.064 0.282] (see Table 1).
We next ﬁtted the models to participants’ conﬁdence ratings. All
models assumed a linear relationship (with negative slope) between
participants’ evaluation of their own memory strength (Prec) and their
belief about how much a hint would boost their performance (Phint_s).
Reported conﬁdence was modeled as a combination of these variables
together with a bias parameter. Model ﬁts were informed by memory
strength (Prec) and criterion (C) parameters obtained from the ﬁts of the
winning model of the recall/choice data (see Methods). The winning
model in both experiments was able to capture the qualitative pattern
of participants’ conﬁdence ratings (see Fig. 6 and Fig. S2). The DIC of
each model is shown in Fig. 3C for Experiment 2a and Fig. S3B for
Experiment 2b. In the winning model with the lowest DIC, the intercept
β0 in the linear relationship between Prec and Phint_s was the same across
all conditions in the 2 (easy vs. diﬃcult)× 2 (saved vs. unsaved) design
(see Table 1). In contrast, β1 was signiﬁcantly lower for diﬃcult (Exp
2a: M=−4.40, SD=18.40; Exp 2b: M=−0.60, SD=0.63) than
easy (Exp 2a: M=−0.45, SD=0.38; Exp 2b: M=−0.36, SD=0.38)
Fig. 5. Ask-for-help behaviour and memory performance in the memory test of Experiment 2a. (A) Proportion of ask-for-help trials in the free-choice test was aﬀected
by both item diﬃculty and whether the pair was saved. (B) Memory performance was signiﬁcantly higher in the free-choice than forced-recall test for saved pairs but
not for unsaved pairs. (C) Memory performance in the free-choice test was signiﬁcantly higher for saved (vs. unsaved) pairs only when participants asked for help.
The red points represent posterior predictives from the best-ﬁtting computational model. Error bars represent standard errors. (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 6. Mean conﬁdence ratings in the free-choice test of Experiment 2a as a function of answer/ask-for-help, whether the conﬁdence was for trials with/without a
hint, and: (A) item diﬃculty; (B) whether the word pair was saved. Conﬁdence was higher when participants chose to answer by themselves, and signiﬁcantly
modulated by the potential beneﬁt of the hint only when participants chose to ask for help. The red points represent posterior predictives from the best-ﬁtting
computational model. Error bars represent standard errors. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
1 Unlike in Experiment 1, the best-ﬁtting model in Experiment 2a was one in
which the eﬀect of hint on objective memory performance (Phint_o) was con-
strained to be equal for easy and diﬃcult trials. In contrast, the hint boosted
memory performance more in easy than diﬃcult trials in Experiment 2b, mean
of the diﬀerence=0.340, 95% CI [0.059 0.580], replicating the ﬁndings of
Experiment 1 (see Table 1).
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trials, Exp 2a: Z=4.493, p < .001; Exp 2b: Z=4.032, p < .001,
again suggesting that participants believed hints could enhance their
recall performance more for easy than diﬃcult pairs even when internal
memory strength was matched.
3.2.4. Individual diﬀerences in oﬄoading behaviour, conﬁdence and
memory performance
Finally, we sought to characterise between-subject relationships
between participants’ overall proportion of ask-for-help trials in the
free-choice test, mean conﬁdence in the free-choice test, and overall
recall performance in the forced-recall test (which reﬂects participants’
memory strength without the help of the hints). There was a signiﬁcant
negative correlation between the proportion of ask-for-help decisions
and mean conﬁdence, Exp 2a: r=−0.782, p < .001; Exp 2b:
r=−0.623, p < .001, revealing that participants who tended to ask
for help more frequently were also less conﬁdent in their memory. The
ask-for-help proportion was also negatively correlated with memory
performance, Exp 2a: r=−0.600, p= .001; Exp 2b: r=−0.535,
p < .001, suggesting that participants who performed worse were also
more likely to take advantage of the help available. Critically, however,
the negative correlation between the ask-for-help proportion and
average conﬁdence remained signiﬁcant even when memory perfor-
mance was controlled, Exp 2a: r=−0.660, p < .001; Exp 2b:
r=−0.514, p= .001 (see Fig. 7A and C). This result suggests that
metacognitive evaluation of memory – as assayed with conﬁdence
ratings – is a key driver of the decision to use oﬄoaded information,
even after accounting for diﬀerences in objective memory ability.
To formally test this hypothesis, we performed a mediation analysis
to ask whether conﬁdence mediated the eﬀect of memory performance
on the decision to ask for help (see Fig. 7B and D). Of the eﬀect of
memory performance on the ask-for-help proportion (Exp 2a:
β=−0.64, 95% CI [−0.99, −0.29], p < .001; Exp 2b: β=−0.54,
95% CI [−0.83, −0.26], p < .001), 65.8% of the variance in Experi-
ment 2a and 38.8% in Experiment 2b was accounted by conﬁdence,
resulting in a signiﬁcant mediation eﬀect (Exp 2a: β=−0.42, 95% CI
[−0.74, −0.15]; Exp 2b: β=−0.21, 95% CI [−0.55, −0.03]). In
addition, the direct eﬀect of memory performance on the ask-for-help
proportion was no longer signiﬁcant in Experiment 2a after accounting
for changes in conﬁdence, β=−0.22, 95% CI [−0.55, 0.12], p= .194
(it remained signiﬁcant in Experiment 2b, β=−0.33, 95% CI [−0.61,
−0.06], p= .018). Together these results conﬁrm that conﬁdence is a
crucial mediator between memory performance and oﬄoading beha-
viour.
Fig. 7. The relationships between participants’ overall proportion of ask-for-help trials in the free-choice test, mean conﬁdence in the free-choice test, and overall
memory performance in the forced-recall test in Experiments 2a, 2b and 3. There was a negative partial correlation between conﬁdence and the ask-for-help
proportion when controlling for memory performance in Experiments 2a (A), 2b (C) and 3 (E). Conﬁdence also mediated the eﬀect of memory performance on the
ask-for-help proportion in Experiments 2a (B), 2b (D) and 3 (F). Asterisks indicate signiﬁcant eﬀects (p < .05). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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3.3. Discussion
In Experiments 2a and 2b we replicated the key relationships be-
tween participants’ oﬄoading behaviour and memory performance
obtained in Experiment 1. Participants both saved more pairs on diﬃ-
cult trials, and asked for help more frequently for diﬃcult, saved pairs
than easy, unsaved pairs. In turn, hints signiﬁcantly enhanced memory
performance when participants asked for help. By eliciting conﬁdence
ratings in Experiments 2a and 2b, we obtained direct evidence that a
decision to ask for help may depend on beliefs about how much hints
can boost performance. We found that people believed a hint could
provide more beneﬁt for memory performance when they chose to ask
for help. In addition, beliefs about such beneﬁts were a function of
conﬁdence in performance, as predicted by our “Negative-slope” model
– when people are more conﬁdent, they believe a hint will provide less
beneﬁt. We also found that participants with lower conﬁdence in their
memory tended to ask for help more frequently even when memory
performance was controlled for, and that conﬁdence signiﬁcantly
mediated the eﬀect of memory performance on the decision to ask for
help. Together these results suggest that conﬁdence (rather than
memory performance) is a key factor in driving decisions to ask for
help.
Importantly, the Negative-slope model was also able to capture the
overall pattern of conﬁdence rating data, providing further constraints
on the functional form of the relationship between memory strength
and beliefs about the helpfulness of hints. Speciﬁcally, the pattern of
participants’ conﬁdence ratings revealed a common intercept across
diﬀerent experimental conditions in the relationship between memory
strength and hint beliefs – in other words, when conﬁdence is very low,
hints are considered uniformly beneﬁcial. In contrast, the perceived
beneﬁt of a hint decreases more rapidly with memory strength for
diﬃcult compared to easy pairs. This feature of the model suggests that
participants believe hints will boost their performance more for easy
than diﬃcult pairs even when such pairs are matched for internal
memory strength. This impact of item diﬃculty may be due to other
metamemory cues contributing to hint beliefs, as we discuss further in
General Discussion.
Up until now, we have focused on the role that conﬁdence in
memory for word pairs plays in decisions to use oﬄoaded information.
However, one factor that might also aﬀect the choice to ask for help is
conﬁdence about whether a word pair had been saved in the ﬁrst place.
For example, participants might be more likely to ask for help when
they were sure that the current word pair had been saved. This inﬂu-
ence was not controlled in previous experiments, because the decision
about whether to save the word pair was under the participant’s con-
trol. We reasoned that variable conﬁdence in the saved/unsaved status
of the word pair might aﬀect or confound our investigation of con-
ﬁdence in memory and its eﬀect on decisions to ask for help in the free-
choice test. To rule out this possibility, we next conducted Experiment 3
in which all of the word pairs were saved during learning, and hints
were always available when participants asked for help in the free-
choice test. In this variant of the task, participants did not need to take
into account whether a pair had been saved when deciding to ask for
help. We nevertheless expected that participants’ decisions to ask for
help would still depend on their beliefs about how much hints could
improve their memory performance, which should in turn be negatively
correlated with conﬁdence in memory.
4. Experiment 3
4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Participants
Forty participants (16 men; age: M=32.93 years, SD=12.15)
were recruited from the Proliﬁc website (https://proliﬁc.ac/) for
monetary compensation (£6.5 plus up to £2, dependent on performance
in the memory test). Participants were tested individually, and all
provided online informed consent. All participants spoke English as a
ﬁrst language and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All
procedures were approved by the local ethics committee.
4.1.2. Materials
The study materials were the same as those used in Experiment 1.
4.1.3. Procedure
The procedure was similar to that in Experiments 2b. The only
diﬀerence was that all of the word pairs were saved during learning
such that participants did not need to decide whether to save each pair.
Participants were told that in the free-choice test they could decide
whether to use a hint to help them (i.e., the choice to ask for help), and
the ﬁrst two letters of the target word would be presented on the screen
at the cost of 3 points whenever they decided to use the hint.
4.1.4. Design and analysis
The experimental design and data analysis were similar to that in
Experiments 2a and 2b. The only diﬀerence was that whether a trial
was saved during learning was no longer an independent variable be-
cause there were no unsaved trials.
4.1.5. Computational modeling
The model structure was the same as that in Experiments 2a and 2b.
For the models ﬁtted to participants’ choices about whether to ask for
help and recall performance in the free-choice test, in each of the three
model sets (Constant, Positive-slope and Negative-slope model; see
Experiment 1 Methods) there were two possible relationships between
the intercept β0 (or C, the criterion for the decision to ask for help)
across diﬀerent conditions: (1) easy= diﬃcult; (2) easy≠ diﬃcult.
There were also two possible relationships between the eﬀect of the
hint on memory performance (Phint_o) in diﬀerent conditions: (1)
easy=diﬃcult, (2) easy≠ diﬃcult. Thus, we ﬁtted 3×2×2=12
models in total. For the models ﬁtted to conﬁdence ratings (see
Experiment 2 Methods), we ﬁtted 2 models in which the intercept β0
was either the same or diﬀerent across easy and diﬃcult conditions.
4.2. Results
Figures of the results of Experiment 3 can be found in the
Supplemental Information.
4.2.1. Replication of oﬄoading behaviour and memory performance
In Experiment 3 we again replicated the patterns of oﬄoading be-
haviour observed in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants asked for help
more frequently for diﬃcult pairs compared to easy pairs, F (1,
39)= 76.42, p < .001, ηp2=0.66. Recall performance was sig-
niﬁcantly higher for easy than diﬃcult pairs, F (1, 39)= 103.61,
p < .001, ηp2=0.73, and also higher in the free-choice test than
forced-recall test, F (1, 39)= 42.93, p < .001, ηp2=0.52, indicating
that using the hints signiﬁcantly beneﬁted recall performance in the
free-choice test. There was also a signiﬁcant interaction, F (1,
39)= 6.76, p= .013, ηp2=0.15, due to the diﬀerence in memory
performance between free-choice and forced-recall being higher for
diﬃcult than easy pairs (see Fig. S4).
4.2.2. Replication of conﬁdence in recall performance of the free-choice test
We also replicated the pattern of conﬁdence ratings observed in
Experiment 2, despite there now being no ambiguity about whether the
pair was previously saved. We obtained a signiﬁcant two-way interac-
tion between the decision to ask for help and the potential beneﬁt of the
hint, F (1, 73.09)= 17.29, p < .001, ηp2=0.19. For trials in which
participants decided to answer by themselves, their conﬁdence ratings
were signiﬁcantly aﬀected by item diﬃculty, F (1, 36.87)= 19.63,
p < .001, ηp2=0.35, but not by the potential beneﬁt provided by a
X. Hu, et al. Cognition 193 (2019) 104012
12
hint, F (1, 69.02)= 0.59, p= .446, ηp2 < 0.01, suggesting that parti-
cipants no longer believed a hint would help them when they decide to
answer by themselves. In contrast, for trials in which participants
decided to ask for help, their conﬁdence was signiﬁcantly modulated by
both item diﬃculty, F (1, 24.85)= 19.91, p < .001, ηp2=0.44, and
the potential beneﬁt of the hint, F (1, 34.96)= 19.99, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.36, suggesting they believed hints could signiﬁcantly boost
their performance (see Fig. S5).
4.2.3. Computational modeling
We again ﬁtted our three candidate sets of models (the Constant
model, Positive-slope model and Negative-slope model) to participants’
recall performance and choices about whether to ask for help. The DIC
scores of the converged models are shown in Fig. S6A. Replicating
previous experiments, the winning model with the lowest DIC was
drawn from the family of Negative-slope models. However, unlike
previous experiments, the best-ﬁtting model was one in which the cri-
terion for the decisions to ask for help (C) was constrained to be equal
for easy and diﬃcult trials (see Table 1). This model ﬁtted well to both
participants’ choice and recall performance (see Fig. S4). In addition,
the hint boosted memory performance (Phint_o) to a greater extent in
easy compared to diﬃcult trials, mean of the diﬀerence=0.306, 95%
CI [0.190 0.418] (see Table 1).
We next ﬁtted the models to participants’ conﬁdence ratings. The
winning model was able to capture the qualitative pattern of partici-
pants’ conﬁdence ratings (see Fig. S5). The DIC of each model is shown
in Fig. S6B. Although in the winning model (with the lowest DIC) the
intercept β0 for the linear relationship between Prec and Phint_s diﬀered
between easy and diﬃcult trials, this diﬀerence did not reach sig-
niﬁcance when comparing parameter estimates, mean of the diﬀer-
ence= 0.056, 95% CI [−0.126 0.223] (see Table 1). Similarly, β1 did
not diﬀer between diﬃcult (M=−0.40, SD=0.38) and easy
(M=−0.41, SD=0.42) trials, t (39)= 0.267, p= .791, d=0.04,
suggesting that participants’ beliefs about how much hints could en-
hance their performance was similar for the two conditions.
4.2.4. Individual diﬀerences in oﬄoading behaviour, conﬁdence and
memory performance
Finally, we replicated the between-subject relationships between
participants’ overall proportion of ask-for-help trials in the free-choice
test, mean conﬁdence in the free-choice test, and overall recall per-
formance in the forced-recall test. There was a signiﬁcant negative
correlation between the proportion of ask-for-help decisions and mean
conﬁdence, r=−0.837, p < .001, and this correlation remained sig-
niﬁcant even when memory performance was controlled, r=−0.430,
p= .006 (see Fig. 7E). As in Experiment 2, we then performed a
mediation analysis to ask whether conﬁdence formally mediated the
eﬀect of memory performance on the decision to ask for help (see
Fig. 7F). Of the eﬀect of memory performance on the ask-for-help
proportion (β=−1.11, 95% CI [−1.35,−0.87], p < .001), 46.1% of
the variance was accounted by conﬁdence, resulting in a signiﬁcant
mediation eﬀect (β=−0.51, 95% CI [−1.12, −0.11]). As in Experi-
ment 2b, the direct eﬀect of memory performance on the ask-for-help
proportion remained signiﬁcant after accounting for changes in con-
ﬁdence, β=−0.60, 95% CI [−1.02, −0.18], p= .006. Taken to-
gether, these results highlight conﬁdence as a key driver of the decision
to use oﬄoaded information.
4.3. Discussion
In Experiment 3, we replicated the key results from Experiments 1
and 2 despite all of the word pairs now being saved during learning,
thus removing any ambiguity about the saved/unsaved status of the
pair during test. Participants’ decisions to ask for help were again
predicted by beliefs about how much hints could boost performance,
and conﬁdence was identiﬁed as a key driver of the decision to use
oﬄoaded information. These results could also be predicted by our
“Negative-slope” model, revealing that participants believed hints
would provide less beneﬁt when they had higher conﬁdence about their
own memory. However, in contrast to the previous experiments, par-
ticipants’ beliefs about the beneﬁt of the hint did not diﬀer between
easy and diﬃcult trials. We consider potential reasons for this diﬀer-
ence in General Discussion.
5. General Discussion
Although previous studies have revealed that cognitive oﬄoading
may improve memory performance (Gilbert, 2015a, 2015b; Risko &
Dunn, 2015), few studies have investigated when and how people rely
on external sources during encoding and retrieval, and whether peo-
ple’s oﬄoading behaviour is related to metacognitive evaluation. To
address this question, in four experiments we asked participants to
learn word pairs and then decide both whether to save each pair during
encoding (in Experiments 1 and 2), and whether to ask for help at test.
In Experiments 2 and 3, participants also evaluated their conﬁdence in
being able to recall the target words with or without the help of a hint.
Our results suggest that the use of oﬄoaded information at test can
signiﬁcantly boost memory performance, and that decisions to use
oﬄoaded information are closely related to metacognitive evaluation
about expected performance across diﬀerent conditions. Speciﬁcally,
participants’ conﬁdence about their own memory ability was negatively
correlated with their beliefs about how much the hints could enhance
their performance. Experiment 3 further supported these results even
when participants did not need to consider whether each trial had been
saved during learning.
A metacognitive model of cognitive oﬄoading suggests that whe-
ther people rely on themselves or external sources in a task depends on
metacognitive evaluation (Dunn & Risko, 2016; Risko & Gilbert, 2016).
Previous studies reveal that the number of to-be-remembered targets
can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the reliance on external sources: people’s con-
ﬁdence about being able to recall the targets decreases when the
number of targets increases, which results in more frequent use of
oﬄoaded information (Gilbert, 2015a, 2015b; Redshaw, Vandersee,
Bulley, & Gilbert, 2018; Risko & Dunn, 2015). Similarly, our results
showed that whether participants chose to save word pairs was also
inﬂuenced by item diﬃculty, manipulated here by the semantic relat-
edness between cue and target words. Many studies have shown that
people’s conﬁdence in recalling weakly-related word pairs is sig-
niﬁcantly lower than recalling strongly-related pairs (Mueller, Tauber,
& Dunlosky, 2013; Undorf & Erdfelder, 2015), which may have led
them to save more weakly-related pairs during learning. A similar
sensitivity to item diﬃculty was also found at retrieval: participants
tended to ask for help more frequently for diﬃcult than easy pairs in the
free-choice test. The eﬀect of diﬃculty on use of oﬄoaded information
at test remained the same in Experiment 3 even when removing am-
biguity about whether each item had been saved, further conﬁrming a
close relationship between oﬄoading decisions and metacognitive
evaluations of item diﬃculty.
Although participants in our experiments asked for help more fre-
quently in the free-choice test for saved pairs, they sometimes sought
hints for unsaved pairs even when none was available. One possible
explanation for this behaviour is that participants asked for help for
these pairs out of desperation when they could not recall the target
words and knew these pairs had not been saved. However, this ex-
planation seems unlikely, because when participants do not know the
answer for an unsaved word pair they are better oﬀ guessing rather
than accepting a loss of 3 points. A more plausible explanation is that
participants might be unsure whether these pairs had been saved when
they decided to ask for help for unsaved pairs. In Experiment 3 we
sought to minimize the impact of this uncertainty by ensuring all pairs
were saved. Future studies may wish to apply the current paradigm to
directly investigate the intriguing role of conﬁdence in the oﬄoading
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process itself.
Our results are consistent with previous studies showing that cog-
nitive oﬄoading is an eﬃcient learning strategy. Cognitive oﬄoading
has been found to improve performance in short-term memory and
prospective memory tasks, for both adults and children, and in both
laboratory and naturalistic environments (Gilbert, 2015a, 2015b;
Redshaw et al., 2018; Risko & Dunn, 2015). In our experiments, recall
performance in the free-choice test was signiﬁcantly higher when par-
ticipants asked for help, due to the adaptive use of hints, suggesting that
the beneﬁt of oﬄoading also extends to tests of long-term memory.
Furthermore, we found that conﬁdence ratings at test were also higher
when participants chose to answer by themselves than ask for help, and
that subjects with lower overall conﬁdence were also more likely to ask
for help. These results are consistent with a metacognitive model of
oﬄoading – people seek help when their conﬁdence in their own ability
is low (Desender et al., 2018; Goupil et al., 2016). Similar results have
also been obtained in a previous survey study that showed a negative
correlation between self-reported internal memory ability and use of
external memory (Finley et al., 2018).
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 also revealed that in the forced-
recall test (when hints were not available), memory performance was
higher for unsaved compared to saved items. There are two possible
explanations for this diﬀerence. First, participants might initially
choose to save pairs with higher diﬃculty, and thus be able to recall
more of the easier, unsaved pairs when hints are unavailable. A second
explanation is that when participants decide to save a word pair, they
put less eﬀort into further encoding this pair due to a (often correct)
belief that they will be able to ask for help in the later memory test.
Thus oﬄoading to the environment might lead to “adaptive forgetting”
of oﬄoaded information (Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011; Storm &
Stone, 2015). Our experiments cannot distinguish these two possibi-
lities, but this hypothesis could be tested in future experiments by in-
troducing trials during encoding in which the option to oﬄoad is not
allowed. In addition, we found that there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in recall performance between the saved and unsaved trials when hints
were available, suggesting the use of oﬄoaded information was able to
boost performance for saved trials and compensate for pre-existing
diﬀerences in memory strength between these conditions.
In Experiments 2 and 3, participants’ conﬁdence ratings about fu-
ture performance was closely linked to their subjective beliefs about
how much hints would boost performance. Participants’ conﬁdence was
signiﬁcantly lower when they chose to ask for help than answer by
themselves, and the best-ﬁtting computational model indicated a ne-
gative relationship between participants’ memory conﬁdence and be-
liefs about how much hints could boost their performance. Our results
build on and extend previous ﬁndings showing that people tend to
oﬄoad information in memory tasks when their evaluation of their own
memory ability is low (Gilbert, 2015b; Risko & Dunn, 2015), and fur-
ther indicate that beliefs about the beneﬁt of oﬄoading are themselves
shaped by metacognitive conﬁdence in performance.
The winning model for the conﬁdence ratings in Experiment 2 re-
vealed that a perceived beneﬁt of hints decreases more rapidly with
memory strength for diﬃcult compared to easy pairs. In other words,
participants believed that hints could boost performance to a greater
extent for easy pairs even when internal memory strength was matched.
Notably, because the overall ask-for-help proportion in the free-choice
test was higher for diﬃcult pairs, this pattern would have remained
hidden without the insights provided by the model (Lewandowsky &
Farrell, 2011). This diﬀerence in hint belief might result from a dif-
ference in the amount of retrieved information related to the target
words in easy and diﬃcult pairs. In the current study, item diﬃculty
was manipulated by semantic relatedness. When participants decide
whether to ask for help, they might ﬁrst attempt to search for the target
word in memory and monitor the outcome of the search. Even when
retrieval of the target word fails, they might retrieve semantic or con-
textual information related to the target (Koriat, 1993), which would be
more easily activated for strongly-related than weakly-related pairs
(Grimaldi & Karpicke, 2012). The relatively large amount of informa-
tion related to the unrecalled target in strongly-related pairs might in
turn lead participants to believe that they would be more likely to re-
trieve the target words with the help of the hints (Koriat, 1993;
Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Bloom, 2017). The consequence of this mixture
of diﬃculty and target-accessibility eﬀects is that participants might be
overall more willing to ask for help for the pairs with medium diﬃculty.
This pattern is also consistent with the region of proximal learning
(RPL) theory of self-regulated learning (Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005),
which proposes that people invest most of their time learning materials
with medium diﬃculty. More broadly, many studies have shown that
metamemory is aﬀected by various cues including the characteristics of
the study items and the conditions of learning (Bjork et al., 2013;
Koriat, 1997; Rhodes, 2015). The current study reveals that people’s use
of oﬄoaded information is aﬀected by at least one of these cues (se-
mantic relatedness). Future studies could proﬁtably manipulate other
cues such as familiarity or ﬂuency (Bjork et al., 2013), and investigate
the eﬀect of metacognitive illusions on cognitive oﬄoading (e.g.,
Rhodes & Castel, 2008).
We also considered whether participants’ decisions to ask for help
might be related to their conﬁdence about whether word pairs had been
saved during learning, rather than their conﬁdence in the memory it-
self. This potential inﬂuence was not controlled in Experiments 1 and 2.
In contrast, in Experiment 3 all of the word pairs were saved during
learning, such that there was no ambiguity about the status of the pair
during retrieval. Importantly, the key results from Experiments 1 and 2
were replicated in Experiment 3: participants’ decisions to ask for help
were closely related to their beliefs about how much hints could boost
their performance, which was negatively correlated with the conﬁdence
about their own memory.
However, one notable diﬀerence was that people’s beliefs about the
eﬀect of hints on performance did not diﬀer between easy and diﬃcult
pairs in Experiment 3. We think there are at least two possible ex-
planations for this diﬀerence. First, the act of making oﬄoading deci-
sions during learning in Experiments 1 and 2 might have aﬀected the
processing of semantic associations for easy word pairs. Previous re-
search has shown that the involvement of metamemory judgments af-
fects memory process selectively for strongly-related word pairs
(Double, Birney, & Walker, 2018; Soderstrom, Clark, Halamish, & Bjork,
2015). For example, Soderstrom et al. (2015) asked participants to
learn a list of strongly and weakly related pairs. Half of the participants
also needed to make predictions during learning about their perfor-
mance on a subsequent test. The participants who made predictions
showed selectively enhanced performance for strongly-related word
pairs, but not for weakly-related pairs. Here we found a similar eﬀect of
oﬄoading decisions on memory: forced-recall performance was sig-
niﬁcantly higher in Experiment 2b (with save decisions) than Experi-
ment 3 (without save decisions) for easy pairs (t=2.821, p= .006),
but not for diﬃcult pairs (t=0.558, p= .579)2. Thus, the involvement
of save decisions might selectively foster the processing of semantic
relatedness for easy pairs, and lead participants to believe that hints
would provide more beneﬁt.
A second possibility is that participants’ conﬁdence about whether
each pair had been saved might play a role in their decisions to ask for
help. Our models assume that participants ask for help based on their
conﬁdence in being able to retrieve the target word, but do not consider
the inﬂuence of conﬁdence in whether help is available in the ﬁrst
place. For instance, if participants mistakenly believed easy pairs were
more likely to be saved than diﬃcult pairs, then this might promote a
decision to ask for help even when memory conﬁdence was equated
between pairs. Future studies could measure conﬁdence about whether
2We compare the recall performance in Experiments 2b and 3 because par-
ticipants in these two experiments came from the same online participant pool.
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each pair has been saved to test this hypothesis.
In Experiments 2 and 3, we found that participants with lower
conﬁdence tended to ask for help more frequently even when memory
performance was controlled, and that conﬁdence mediated the re-
lationship between memory performance and the decision to ask for
help. These results again suggest that metacognitive evaluation of
performance (rather than changes in memory performance per se) is a
key driver of cognitive oﬄoading. We note however that such a dis-
sociation between performance and conﬁdence is not directly captured
by our current computational model, which is a ﬁrst-order model and
assumes that conﬁdence is tightly coupled to memory performance. In
contrast, these results may be better accounted for by a second-order
model which allows for diﬀerential inﬂuences on conﬁdence and per-
formance (Fleming & Daw, 2017). Future research may proﬁtably ex-
tend the model developed in the current study to construct a second-
order architecture that is able to fully capture the relationship between
performance, conﬁdence and oﬄoading behaviour (Dunn & Risko,
2016).
The use of cognitive oﬄoading during learning is increasingly ubi-
quitous due to the rapid development of technology (Risko & Gilbert,
2016). For example, we often set reminders using a smartphone or take
notes with a laptop when listening to lectures. By understanding when
and how people rely on these external tools during learning, psychol-
ogists and educators can guide people towards more eﬀective use of
modern technologies to maximise their eﬀect on memory performance.
The current research highlights a close relationship between metacog-
nitive evaluation (conﬁdence) about memory performance and oﬀ-
loading behaviour during learning.
We should also note that there are clear diﬀerences between the
oﬄoading process as studied here and everyday life. First, while par-
ticipants in our experiments could only receive a two-letter hint when
they asked for help for saved word pairs, people typically have access to
the full information they need when retrieving from external sources
such as computer ﬁles or smartphones. Another diﬀerence is that re-
trieving information from external sources is typically more time-con-
suming than relying on memory (Arango-Muñoz, 2013). This relatively
low eﬃciency of external memory may be taken into account when
people decide whether to use oﬄoaded information (Schönpﬂug, 1986)
– a cost we attempted to simulate in the current study through the loss
of points. If there is no cost for use of external memory, people may be
more likely to routinely seek help from external sources (even if they
are highly conﬁdent in their internal memory) because such hints are
usually beneﬁcial. However, presumably there is always some implicit
cost (e.g. the energetics of the cognitive/motor processes needed to ask
for and process the hint), such that hint use may still tradeoﬀ against
conﬁdence in those circumstances. Future research is needed to ex-
amine how our ﬁndings translate into contexts in which people are
learning from more naturalistic materials (e.g., textbooks or lectures) in
their daily learning environment, and whether oﬄoading behaviours
can be optimized in such scenarios.
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